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Abstract 
Many anti-corruption campaigns aim to encourage citizens to demand better control 
over corruption. Recent literature suggests that perceived high levels of corruption 
and government effectiveness in controlling corruption will limit citizens’ willingness 
to actively oppose corruption.  Using Transparency International’s 2013 Global 
Corruption Barometer we test these ideas across a 71 country sample. We find that 
perceived government effectiveness tends to encourage anticorruption action, while 
perceptions of corruption being widespread tend to have the opposite impact in non-
OECD countries. Our analyses also suggest that the interaction between these 
perceptions are important; we find that especially among those who perceive that the 
level of corruption is high, when confidence in the government’s efforts grows so 
does their willingness fight corruption.  
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Over the last fifteen years, the effort and investment poured into fighting 
corruption in the developing world has grown seemingly exponentially (see Michael 
and Bowser, 2009:1), and the focus of donor supported anticorruption initiatives has 
arguably broadened, as well (Johnson, Taxell & Zaum, 2012; Schmidt 2007).  Along 
with targeting the ‘supply’ of corruption, through the support of reforms that promise 
to ensure greater government transparency, a reduction in civil servants’ discretion 
over resources, and harsher punishments for corrupt transgressions (Agarwal and Van 
Wicklin III, 2012; Shah 2007), it is now the norm that anti-corruption initiatives also 
tackle the “demand-side” too. Demand-side initiatives share in common the goals of 
widening the socio-political space available for citizens to demand better control over 
corruption and empowering citizens’ groups to do so (Chene, 2008; Schmidt 2007; 
McNeil and Malena 2010). The logic behind these types of initiatives is rooted in the 
assumption that where political commitment to reform is lacking, “the demands and 
protests emanating from civil society can induce reluctant political leaders to conduct 
anti-corruption purges” (William 2000: xvi).  
However, as several have noted, programs that simply facilitate an opening in 
the socio-political space available for citizens to voice their grievances or participate 
in government decision-making do not necessarily result in greater accountability 
(Ackerman, 2004; O’Neil et al., 2007:4-5; Malena et al. 2004). People face varying 
social, economic, and political obstacles to voicing demands for a more corrupt free 
environment (Chene, 2008; McGee and Gaventa, 2011). Moreover, even when 
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citizens have the ability to take advantage of opportunities to express their grievances, 
it is not entirely clear that many will be willing to do so.  
The first contribution of this research is to examine the drivers of variable 
willingness to engage in anticorruption civic action, and we focus specifically on 
empirically investigating arguments made in recent literature on how different 
perceptions of the corruption environment impact willingness to participate 
anticorruption civic activism. Based on lessons from Kenya and Uganda, Persson, 
Rothstein and Teorell (2013), argue that when there is a pervasive perception across 
society that everyone is engaging in corruption, most citizens will be inclined to 
“perpetrate rather than fight corrupt exchanges” (7). And, drawing on data from a 
survey of Swedes, Bauhr (2012) has argued that when people perceive that their 
government is capable of controlling corruption, they will view their own efforts 
within civil society to oppose corruption as unnecessary.  
Thus far, these hypotheses have not been tested outside of the narrow contexts 
within which they were developed. Using data from Transparency International’s 
2013 Global Corruption Barometer, we test these hypotheses using indicated 
willingness to engage in four types of anticorruption activities—namely, reporting 
corruption, participating in anticorruption protests, joining an anticorruption 
organisation, and paying more for products from a company that is corruption free—
across a sample that includes responses from 71 countries. Leveraging the breadth of 
this sample, we find that the determinants of willingness to engage in anticorruption 
activism tend to differ across OECD and non-OECD contexts. For example, we find 
that perceptions of corruption being widespread tend to hamper willingness to fight 
corruption in a non-OECD setting, but encourage it in an OECD setting. 
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The second contribution this research makes is providing a test of how the 
interaction of these different perceptions influence willingness to fight corruption.  In 
doing so, we find that, especially among those who perceive that corruption levels are 
high, when confidence in the government’s efforts grows so will willingness to fight 
corruption. This is our most robust finding, as it holds up in all five non-OECD 
sample analyses, and in two of the five OECD sample analyses. Finally, based on our 
results, we conclude with some thoughts on how anticorruption awareness campaigns 
can best encourage a broad civil society response, and on how future research can 
further explore the link between perceptions of corruption and anticorruption 
activism.  
Demanding control of corruption 
Demand-side development programming—initiatives that support citizen 
groups’ engagement in the public arena—inherently assume that citizen feedback can 
have a positive influence on developmental policy design and implementation. A 
World Bank guidance note describes the expected relationship between citizens 
expressing their voice and development outcomes: “…a vibrant civil society, and a 
transparent flow of information support poverty reduction by helping to hold 
governments accountable for delivering better services, creating jobs, and improving 
living standards” (The World Bank, 2009: 5). Like other demand-side development 
initiatives, those focusing on anticorruption do not assume the presence of an engaged 
citizenry; however, their effectiveness is thought to hinge upon it. Who should we 
expect to become engaged in an anticorruption focused civil society?  
Very little has been written on the topic of anticorruption activism. Unlike 
questions of people’s direct experiences with bribery, which now appear on many 
cross-national barometers (Rose and Peiffer, 2015), many surveys do not ask 
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questions about willingness to report corruption or protest against it. Perhaps as a 
result, the question of who is most likely to demand greater control of corruption 
remains understudied. In our consideration of this issue we did not find any other 
research that had examined the issue of corruption activism using data from the few 
surveys that have posed questions about reporting corruption. Recently, however, 
using data from qualitative interviews, two studies have suggested that certain 
perceptions of the corruption environment impact a person’s willingness to engage in 
anticorruption activism. It is from these arguments that we derive the two main 
hypotheses that we test in this paper; we review them below. 
Potentially important role of perceptions  
Perceptions of the scale of corruption  
In their insightful article, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013), argue that 
traditional anticorruption interventions have failed because they are based on a 
mischaracterization of the problem. Most often seen through the prism of principal-
agent theory, corruption is conventionally thought to occur when civil servants have 
discretion over public services and lack accountability. Through this view, corruption 
can be effectively tackled when ‘principals’ reduce government officials’ level of 
discretion over services, increase their own ability to monitor officials’ actions, and/or 
impose harsher punishments on those that get caught. Critical of this take on 
corruption, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013), argue that in systemically corrupt 
contexts corruption is best understood as a collective action problem, instead. From 
their perspective, the application of the principal-agent theory mistakenly assumes 
that there will be ‘principled principals’ in civil society and in positions of power that 
will want fight corruption through civic action or enforce anticorruption laws.  
According to Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013), when corruption is 
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systemic and perceived to be the norm, it is far more likely that people will continue 
to go with the corrupt grain, regardless of the reforms that are passed in the national 
capital (see also Marquette, 2012; Bauhr and Grimes, 2014). In this context most 
citizens will be inclined to “perpetrate rather than fight corrupt exchanges” (Perrson, 
Rothstein and Teorell, 2013: 7). For Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) collective 
action theory makes sense of this; it recognizes that peoples’ perceptions of others’ 
actions can reduce their willingness to work towards a common goal, even when the 
collective good will ostensibly benefit everyone if it was reached. Therefore, in 
contrast to a principal-agent approach to corruption, which tends to focus on the 
incentives an individual faces when making a choice to engage in corruption at a 
discrete point in time, a collective action theoretical approach highlights how 
collective or societal dynamics can work to sustain different patterns of practiced 
corruption.1  
For Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013), corrupt countries do not remain 
corrupt because they lack the legal framework or national institutions to fight it, but 
because people think their own actions to fight or abstain from corruption will not 
make a difference. From this logic, a perception that corruption is widespread or 
normal induces a ‘corruption fatigue’;2 instead of motivating people to voice their 
discontent with how pervasive corruption is, people become less motivated to do 
anything to counter it. From Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2013), we derive the 
                                                     
1 See Marquette and Peiffer (2015) for a review of how the two theoretical 
perspectives differ as they have been applied to anticorruption.   
2 The term ‘corruption fatigue’ is used in this article to articulate the idea that, instead 
of motivating people to actively oppose corruption, perceptions of corruption being 
widespread work to make people less motivated and/or disengage altogether from 
doing anything to counter it. 
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first hypothesis we test:  
H1: The more a person perceives corruption to be pervasively practiced in 
society, the less willing they will be to engage in anticorruption activism. 
One counter argument to this notion is that perceptions of corruption levels 
will not necessarily have a significant impact on willingness to fight corruption. 
Marquette and Peiffer (2015) have argued that a collective action theoretical approach 
to corruption should go beyond considering what impact perceptions have on the 
decision to engage in or fight against corruption. They argue that people may be 
reluctant to collectively fight corruption because the status quo is morally, politically, 
or materially defensible for those involved. This means that, depending on the 
context, many other variables, like the presence of societal norms that define corrupt 
acts as favorable expressions of reciprocity and/or whether corrupt exchanges satisfy 
material or political needs in an environment of poorly performing state institutions, 
may be more influential in shaping willingness to fight corruption. 
A second counter argument, of course, is that perceptions of corruption being 
widespread or on the rise will instead serve as a motivating grievance for people to 
engage in anticorruption civic action.   Drawing from research and case studies on 
social accountability, this is the assumption made by principal-agent theory inspired 
transparency initiatives (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2013; Bauhr and Grimes, 
2014; Kolstag and Wiig, 2009). Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) explain that societal 
accountability occurs when citizens and civil society organizations successfully 
publicize perceived government abuses and have compelled government institutions 
to investigate and issue related sanctions. Thus, transparency, through the lens of 
principal-agent theory, is expected to reduce citizens’ cost of monitoring public 
officials, and through its publicization of corruption, heighten public awareness of 
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corruption, once hidden. Those espousing for greater transparency make an implicit 
assumption that citizens will disapprove of the corrupt acts revealed, and that such 
disapproval will translate into a willingness to become active in the effort to try to 
hold corrupt officials accountable (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014).   
While several scholars have documented cases wherein ordinary citizens have 
effectively served as citizen ‘auditors’ to the government (Kaufman, 2002), and have 
created more transparency and accountability in government as a result (Fox, 2007), 
the chances of transparency measures evolving into greater social accountability are 
recognised to be tempered by the particularities of the governance environment within 
which they exist (Fenster 2006; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Bauhr and Nasiritousi, 
2012). In the first instance, if perceptions of corruption hamper willingness to fight 
corruption, as Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) argue, then transparency efforts 
that expose corruption may backfire by heightening the public’s perceptions of 
corruption, and by extension reducing popular willingness to fight corruption (see also 
Bauhr and Grimes, 2014). Moreover, others have found that transparency measures 
have a limited impact on social accountability in contexts where citizens lack 
education, media circulation is limited, and where elections are less than free and/or 
fair (see Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010). Transparency alone is therefore widely 
recognized to not be enough to ensure greater social accountability.  
Perceptions of the government’s response 
How pervasive corruption is perceived to be across society is only one 
dimension of a person’s perceived corruption environment. Also held are perceptions 
of how effective/ineffective the government is in its own efforts to control corruption. 
What impact do these perceptions have on willingness to actively oppose corruption? 
Examining the responses to a survey from a Swedish sample, Bauhr (2012) found that 
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corruption was both perceived to be a marginal problem and something that the 
political system could control itself. For Bauhr (2012), this high level of institutional 
trust works to produce a lack of civic engagement, as it gives citizens a “(potentially 
unwarranted) high trust that the government is able to deal with corruption” (79). 
Taking this argument to its extreme suggests that even when the problem of 
corruption is made salient, if people think that the government is able to control it, 
people will see no point in engaging in anti-corruption activities to counter it. From 
Bauhr’s (2012) study, we derive the second hypothesis we test:  
H2: The more a person perceives their government’s efforts to control 
corruption as effective, the less willing they will be to engage in 
anticorruption activism. 
A more nuanced argument to this one is put forward by Machado, et al. 
(2009); examining survey data from Latin America, they find that when political 
institutions were perceived to be strong and reliable, individuals were more likely to 
refrain from unconventional political action, like protesting, and instead channel their 
grievances through more ‘legitimate’ means, such as voting. Therefore, perceived 
institutional effectiveness may have varying effects on different types of political 
action. Of course, the opposite to Bauhr’s (2012) argument could instead be true, as 
well. People may feel encouraged by a perceived effective government’s response to 
control corruption and want to join in on the anticorruption fight, instead of sit on the 
side-lines.  Along this vein and in more general terms, several studies have found that 
institutional trust is negatively linked to political disaffection (Pharr and Putnam 
2000; Catterberg and Moreno, 2006; Levi and Stoker, 2000). 
 Both, Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2013) and Bauhr (2012) frame their 
arguments to be context specific. For Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013), the 
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negative influence that a perception of widespread corruption likely has on 
anticorruption engagement is a symptom of living in a systemically corrupt context. 
Indeed they found in their interviews of Ugandans and Kenyans—arguably, 
systemically corrupt countries—that despite moral disapproval of corruption, their 
interviewees often viewed efforts to fight corruption as futile, and justified their own 
engagement in corruption as a necessary evil. Similarly, for Bauhr (2012), whose 
observations are based on responses from a Swedish survey, institutional trust hinders 
civic anticorruption engagement in a context wherein corruption exists only at the 
margins. While instructive, by design both studies do not address how, if at all, 
generalizable these relationships are.  
 The question of generalizability has important policy consequences. For those 
working to encourage a civil society anticorruption response, the outlined hypotheses 
have important implications. Should anticorruption awareness raising campaigns 
publicize messages of corruption being a widespread problem? Or will those backfire, 
by limiting willingness to get involved? How about the government’s efforts? Should 
successful stories of government interventions be highlighted or downplayed? 
Moreover, absent from the discussion thus far is how these perceptions interact with 
one another to impact anticorruption activism. After all, people hold perceptions of 
many different dimensions of their corruption environment at the same time.  
We offer two contributions to the discussion on how perceptions impact active 
anticorruption opposition. First, with GCB’s 2013 survey data, we test the outlined 
hypotheses using responses from people in 71 countries. Specifically, we examine 
how well each hypothesis is supported in a 23 OECD country sample, and a 48 non-
OECD country sample. By splitting the total sample we are able to examine how 
context specific the evidence for each of the hypotheses is. Second, we examine how 
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perceptions of the corruption environment interact with each other to shape 
willingness to engage in anticorruption activity. We describe our data source and 
variables of interest next.  
 
Willingness to Engage Across Countries 
We rely on Transparency International’s 2013 wave of the Global Corruption 
Barometer (GCB) as it included questions to respondents about their willingness to 
actively oppose corruption. We benefit from its large cross-national reach, and in the 
aim of focusing on nationally representative samples, we use data from 71 of the 109 
countries the survey was administered in.3 No other survey has reached such a large 
sample with questions about active opposition to corruption.  
The questions on active opposition to corruption appear toward the end of the 
survey, after demographic questions and questions about perceptions of and 
experiences with corruption. Several yes/no questions are asked in a battery, wherein 
the respondents are first told, “there are different things people could do to fight 
corruption and I am now going to ask whether you would be willing to do any of the 
following.” The anticorruption activities we examine are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. ACTIVITIES IN OPPOSITION TO CORRUPTION ON GCB 2013 
1. Take part in a peaceful protest or demonstration against corruption. 
2. Join an organization that works to reduce corruption as an active member. 
3. Pay more to buy from a company that is clean/corruption free. 
4. Report an incident of corruption. 
 
                                                     
3 We excluded 12 countries from our analysis because Transparency International 
advised us that data from those samples were potentially unreliable, and 20 other 
countries because their samples’ socio-demographic representation were inconsistent 
with what we expected given other sources of data. If requested, the authors can 
provide a more detailed discussion of the exclusion criteria used. 
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 These activities—taking part in a protest, becoming an active member of an 
anticorruption organization, paying more to a corrupt-free company and reporting 
corruption—arguably all require varying costs to the individual, in terms of time, 
effort, or monetary engagement, and range from formalized to informal activities. For 
example, participating in an anticorruption protest would require an individual to 
travel to the anticorruption protest and ostensibly be there for a few hours of one day, 
while becoming an active member of a formal organization would require more 
regular dedication on behalf of the activist.4  
 As Figure 1 indicates, a majority of our sample stated that they would report 
corruption (63 percent of the total sample). Half were willing to protest, a little less 
than half were willing to pay more to a corruption free company, and about two fifths 
said they would join an anticorruption organization as an active member. Close to 
equal fifths of the total sample are spread across a five point scale of how many of 
these activities one would be willing to participate in; specifically, 23 percent 
indicated that they were willing to participate in all four of the activities, 19 percent in 
only three, 20 percent in only two, 19 percent in only one, and 21 percent in none of 
the activities.   
 
                                                     
4 Also asked is whether people would be willing to sign an anticorruption petition or 
spread the word on social media. We do not examine those actions as they do not 
require a significant time commitment, or cost to the individual.  
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These percentages of willingness to actively oppose corruption are strikingly 
high; even in countries where protests are frequently held nowhere near half of the 
population find themselves joining in. It is likely that these survey questions on 
willingness to oppose corruption have triggered a social desirability effect in 
responses. Respondents may feel some pressure to conform to the socially expected 
behavior that one would want to oppose corruption, regardless of whether or not they 
ultimately end up carrying out such behavior. This, however, is not necessarily a 
limitation of the data; although indicating on a survey that you are willing to engage 
in anticorruption activism is relatively ‘cost’ free in and of itself, and thus, not a 
perfect indicator of whether someone will actually get involved, the responses to these 
questions are arguably still differentiating between those that think that such 
endeavors might be worthwhile and those who do not. 
Figure 1 highlights response differences across the OECD and non-OECD 
samples. Except in the case of reporting, respondents in non-OECD countries 
30%
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generally indicate a higher degree of willingness to engage in anticorruption activism 
than do OECD respondents. Compared with OECD willingness rates, non-OECD 
respondents are a further 22 percent willing to join an anticorruption organization, a 
further 19 percent are willing to protest, and a further 8 percent are willing to pay 
more for a corruption free product. In contrast, OECD respondents, on average, are 
slightly more willing to report corruption. It is also important to note that comparisons 
of these country groupings hide a great deal of variation. For instance, roughly the 
same percentage (6 percent) of respondents from the Belgian and Jordanian sample 
are willing to engage in all four activities and 89 percent of both the Canadian and 
Ugandan sample would engage in at least one.  
 
Measuring Perceptions of the Corruption Environment 
The GCB includes many questions gauging respondents’ perceptions of their 
corruption environment.5 Perceived corruption levels in society are approximated by 
responses to a battery of questions that ask “to what extent do you see the following 
categories in this country to be affected by corruption?”  The government-related 
sectors that are asked about are political parties, parliament, military, education, 
medical, judiciary, police, and public officials. The possible answers range from 1, 
not at all corrupt to 5, extremely corrupt.  
Figure 2 shows the mean responses to these questions, by OECD/non-OECD 
country categories. On average, OECD respondents perceive public institutions to be 
less corrupt than non-OECD respondents. However, the differences across the OECD 
and non-OECD divide are slight for evaluations of many institutions; on average, 
                                                     
5 The highest correlation between the three perception measures discussed used is -
0.38, which is between “corruption increase” and “government is effective.” 
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OECD respondents only rate their military, education system, medical sector, public 
officials, and parliament/legislature as a half or less than half a point less corrupt than 
non-OECD respondents. In contrast, an average non-OECD citizen tends to judge the 
police, political parties and judicial system much more harshly than an average OECD 
citizen.  
 
 
 
For our analyses, we used principal component factor analysis to construct 
perceived measures of corruption levels from the responses to all of these questions. 
This was done for the OECD sample and the non-OECD sample separately. The 
factor analyses formed a single factor with an eigen value well over 1.0 for both 
samples (4.3 for the OECD sample and 3.6 for the non-OECD sample). In both cases, 
higher values of the factor score indicate higher perceived levels of corruption in the 
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government.  
To test the second hypothesis, which focuses on perceived government’s 
effectiveness in controlling corruption, we use responses from GCB’s question, “how 
effective do you think your government’s actions are in the fight against corruption?” 
Responses to this question are on a scale that ranges from 1, very ineffective to 5, 
very effective. The mean perception score of how effective the government is in 
addressing corruption across the two samples are similar; on average, the OECD 
sample rates government effectiveness in controlling corruption at a 2.4, and the non-
OECD sample gives an average rating of 2.5.  
Also controlled for in our analyses is an additional perception measure. It is 
based on a single question in the GCB of how corruption is perceived to have changed 
over the last two years. To this question respondents can answer on a scale of 1, 
decreased a lot to 5, increased a lot. Arguably, if people do tend to suffer from 
‘corruption fatigue’—wherein a perception of corruption being widely practiced in 
society negatively impacts willingness to actively oppose corruption—then it might 
also be true that a perceived notion that corruption is increasing will also hamper 
willingness to engage in anticorruption activism. The mean response to this question 
across OECD and non-OECD categories is the same: 3.7, which is somewhere 
between thinking that corruption ‘stayed the same’ or ‘increased a little’. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
In the analyses that follow, indicated willingness to report, protest, pay more, 
and join an anticorruption organization are our respective dependent variables. 
Additionally, using tetrachoric correlations in factor analysis, we created an index of 
willingness to engage in anticorruption civic engagement, which is based on 
 17 
responses to the questions on all four of the actions reviewed. The index aims to 
capture the extent to which a respondent is willing to engage in anticorruption 
activism, more generally.6 As the response options to the activism questions were 
yes/no, we employ logit analyses when analyzing their determinants, and regression 
analysis when analyzing the determinants of the anticorruption civic engagement 
index.7 To account for the multi-level structure of our data, each analysis treats 
countries as cluster variables. Additionally, in all reported statistics and analyses we 
weight each country-sample with the provided survey weight and incorporate into it a 
weight to equalize the samples across countries, so as to avoid giving one country-
sample undue influence in aggregated statistics.  Because our country-level samples 
are considerably smaller (23 for OECD and 48 for non-OECD) than our individual-
level samples, we use a 0.10 p-value as the threshold for considering a country-level 
variable significant, and the standard 0.05 p-value as the threshold for considering 
individual-level variables as significant.  
In each analysis, in addition to testing what impact each of the perceptions 
variables reviewed have, we control for several other potential influential variables. 
The list includes an individual’s gender, age, income, education, urban locale, and 
                                                     
6 Tetrachoric correlations were necessary to use in the factor analyses because the 
responses to each of the activism questions are dichotomous. Two indices were 
produced, one for each sample; in both cases, a single factor with an eigen value well 
over 1.0 was created (2.0 for the OECD sample and 2.8 for the non-OECD sample). 
Higher values of the factor scores indicate greater willingness to engage in 
anticorruption activism.  
7 The primary data set we use—Transparency International’s 2013 Global Corruption 
Barometer—is cross-sectional (i.e. gathered at a single point in time). Like most 
analyses of survey data, this means that our analyses are unable to establish whether 
causal relationships exist between variables. 
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experience in participating in bureaucratic corruption (number of services bribed in 
the last year) and interfacing with the state (the number of state services the 
respondent has contacted in the last year). At the country level, we also control for the 
degree of democracy (Freedom House composite score, reversed so that higher 
numbers indicate more freedom), a measure of state ‘modernity’ (the percentage of 
women working in the workforce), and a country’s wealth (GDP per capita, ppp). 
Summary statistics and details on coding for all of the variables we use in analyses are 
detailed in Appendix Table 1. 
 
Estimating the direct links between perceptions and anticorruption activism 
 As the hypotheses we outlined earlier deal with the potential direct effects that 
perceptions have on willingness to engage in anticorruption activism, we first estimate 
regressions without the inclusion of interaction terms between the perceptions 
variables. Table 2 shows the results of each analysis performed. As standard logit 
coefficients are difficult to interpret, we instead report predicted probability shifts for 
the analyses that use logistic regression. The shifts articulate estimations of how the 
predicted probability of being willing to engage in anticorruption activism changes 
when, holding the effects of all other variables constant, a shift is made in the 
independent variable of interest from its minimum to its maximum value. Predicted 
probability shifts not only illustrate the direction of the association between the 
independent and dependent variables—a positive shift illustrates a positive 
association—but they also indicate the size of the effect that each independent 
variable is estimated to have on the dependent variable. Moreover, as we calculate 
like predicted probability shifts—a minimum to maximum shift for all variables—the 
size of the estimated shifts are meaningfully comparable across variables. Finally, as 
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it is difficult to interpret the size of an estimated impact on determining a factor score, 
we report simple OLS regression coefficients for the models determining the activism 
indices.  
Table 2: Analyses of the Determinants of Activism 
 NON-OECD  OECD  
 
Report Protest Join org. Pay more Index Report Protest Join org. Pay more Index 
Predicted probability shifts Coef. Predicted probability shifts Coef. 
     Perceptions 
    
      
Corruption level -0.15* -0.11* -0.10 -0.14* -0.02* -0.05 0.12* 0.19*** -0.08 0.02 
Gov’t effective 0.10*** 0.02 0.06** 0.03 0.01* -0.01 -0.15*** -0.03 0.06* -0.01 
Corruption increase 0.06 0.06* 0.08** 0.05 0.02* 0.06 0.11*** 0.05* 0.02 0.02* 
     Individual level controls 
   
      
# of bribes -0.15* -0.03 0.04 -0.14* -0.01 -0.25** 0.12 0.17* -0.01 0.01 
# of contacts 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.03*** 0.31*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.03*** 
Female -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.02** -0.01* -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03** -0.03*** 0.02* -0.02*** 
Age -0.07** -0.14*** -0.12*** 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.09** -0.04 0.03 -0.01 
Income 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.00 
Education 0.03 -0.08* 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.25*** 0.03 0.09** 0.20*** 0.05*** 
Urban 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04* 0.03* 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 
     Contextual controls 
   
      
FH democracy 0.15 0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.21 -0.09 -0.20 -0.23 -0.09 
% women in work 0.12+ 0.14 0.30*** 0.22* 0.00** 0.12 0.03 -0.12 -0.20 -0.00 
GDP per capita -0.14 -0.22* -0.32*** -0.20+ -0.01** 0.06 -0.11 0.02 0.12 0.00 
           
N 36642 36642 36642 36642 36642 17354 17354 17354 17354 17354 
Wald chi2 306 244 202 110  625 214 436 345  
Prob >chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03  0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04  
F     19.32     22.00 
Prob>F     0.00     0.00 
R-squared     0.09     0.09 
Levels of statistical significance are denoted by ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, and +p<0.10 (applied only to 
country-level variables) 
The results from our analyses lend mixed support to the idea that a perception 
of corruption being widespread reduces willingness to engage in anticorruption 
activism (H1). In relatively strong support of the hypothesis, we find in four of the 
five non-OECD analyses that perceived corruption is significantly and negatively 
related to willingness to engage in anticorruption activism. Specifically, holding the 
effects of all else constant, a shift in perceived corruption from a minimum to 
maximum level engenders a predicted 15 percent decrease in the probability of being 
willing to report corruption, 11 percent decrease in the probability of being willing to 
join an anticorruption protest, and a 14 percent decrease in the probability of being 
willing to pay more for a corruption free product. It is also negatively and 
significantly associated with the willingness to engage in anticorruption activism 
index. These findings strongly support H1, which articulates the argument advanced 
by Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013);  in countries where corruption is thought to 
exist more systemically, people’s perceptions of corruption levels as being high can 
work to evoke a ‘corruption fatigue’, thereby reducing willingness to fight the issue.  
In contrast, in OECD countries, when significantly associated, our analyses 
suggest that a high level of perceived corruption works to ignite the activist spirit. 
This trend, however, is illustrated in only in two of the five OECD models; in the 
other three there is not a significant association found. Holding the effects of all else 
constant, the estimated change in probability of being willing to protest and join an 
anticorruption organization when perceived corruption goes from its minimum to 
maximum value increases by 12 and 19 percentage points, respectively. Therefore, 
together, these ‘mixed’ results breathe life into a cohesive message: whether and how 
perceptions of corruption levels impact willingness to get involved in the fight against 
corruption does indeed depend very much on the context within which corruption is 
 22 
perceived. 
A less clear message emerges from the estimated impact that government 
effectiveness has on willingness to get involved. In only two of the OECD and in 
three of the non-OECD models is government effectiveness found to be significantly 
associated with willingness to engage in anticorruption activism. In four models, 
perceived government effectiveness is positively associated with willingness to get 
engaged, while in one it is negatively so. Specifically, holding the effects of all else 
constant, a shift from a minimum perceived level of government effectiveness to a 
maximum level is associated with a 10 percent increase in the probability of being 
willing to report corruption and a six percent increase in the probability of being 
willing to join an anticorruption organization in the non-OECD sample, and a six 
percent increase in the probability of being willing to pay more for a corruption free 
product in the OECD sample. It is also significantly and positively related to the 
activism index in the non-OECD model.  In contrast, it is significantly and negatively 
associated with being willing to protest corruption in the OECD sample; only this 
finding offers support for the hypothesis advanced by Bauhr (2012) (H2) that 
perceived government effectiveness will hinder activism in contexts where corruption 
exists more incidentally in society.  
For both samples, when significantly associated with willingness to actively 
oppose corruption, a perception that corruption is increasing compels willingness 
rather than reduces it. A shift from thinking that corruption has decreased a lot in the 
last two years to increased a lot in the last two years is associated with a predicted six 
percent and 11 percent increase in the probability of being willing to protest for non-
OECD and OECD samples, respectively (holding the effects of all else constant).  
Similar shifts are associated with a predicted eight and five percent increase in the 
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probability of being willing to join an anticorruption protest for non-OECD and 
OECD samples, respectively. A perception of corruption increasing is also 
significantly and positively associated with the activism index for both samples. 
These results are particularly interesting given the fairly consistent message 
given by the estimated impact of perceived corruption levels on anticorruption 
activism in the non-OECD sample models. To summarize the paradox: on the one 
hand, we find, of the non-OECD sample, that perceptions of corruption being widely 
practiced tend to reduce willingness to get involved, and on the other hand, we also 
find that a perceived notion of corruption becoming a greater problem may work to 
counter ‘corruption fatigue’ by compelling willingness to engage in the fight against 
corruption. As these are two distinctly different perceptions, this message is not 
necessarily inconsistent. People may be swayed in one direction by their perceptions 
of how widespread corruption is, and in another direction entirely by a perception that 
corruption is becoming more of a problem. 
Taken together, uneven support emerges for the outlined hypotheses. 
Perceptions have inconsistently estimated direct effects on the dependent variables. 
Most strongly, the message emerges that perceived systematic corruption works to 
reduce willingness to engage in activism in the non-OECD setting, and, if impactful at 
all, likely induces it in the OECD setting. Less robustly, we find that perceived 
government effectiveness and perceptions of corruption increasing tends to compel 
willingness to get involved. The lack of robustness found of the effects of perceptions 
stands in strong contrast to the estimated impact of being a man, and having frequent 
contact with the state’s services; consistently, these factors are found to significantly 
and positively impact willingness to engage in anticorruption activism. Of the two, the 
number of state contacts garners the largest estimated effect. For example, a shift 
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from having zero to eight contacts with the state is associated with a 31 percent 
increase in the probability of being willing to report corruption in the OECD sample 
and a 22 percent increase in the non-OECD sample, holding all else equal. In contrast, 
a shift from being a male to being a female is only associated with a 3 percent 
decrease, in the probability of reporting corruption in the non-OECD sample and a 2 
percent decrease in the OECD sample.  
Moreover, some of the control variables appear to have sample specific 
effects. For instance, in OECD models, education seems to matter; people with a 
higher level of education are more willing to protest, join an organisation and pay 
more for a corruption free product. Education is also positively associated with the 
index of engagement for that sample. Age is a consistent predictor across all 
dependent variables in the non-OECD sample models; in that setting, older people are 
less likely willing to report, protest, or join an organisation, but more likely willing to 
pay more for a corruption free product. It is also negatively associated with the index 
of engagement. In the OECD sample models, age is only significantly related to 
willingness to protest, and it is negatively so.  
In our non-OECD sample models, there tends to be a positive and significant 
association with activism and living in a country where a high percentage of women 
work in the formal labour market. The percentage of women in the formal workforce 
has been used elsewhere as a proxy for a more culturally modern, or individualistic 
(as opposed to a collectivist) society (Peiffer and Boussalis, 2010). More than a 
culturally traditional society, a culturally modern society is thought to put greater 
value on gender equality and the rights of individuals and minorities. Perhaps these 
cultural attributes give respondents a feeling of empowerment to voice their 
discontent with a corrupt transgression. In contrast, income, urbanisation and the level 
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of democracy, the latter of which we expected would especially encourage 
engagement in civic action through its securement of civil liberties, were either not at 
all significantly associated to willingness to engage in anticorruption activism in any 
of the models or registered somewhat minor significance in only a couple of the 
models.  
How perceptions interact 
Thus far we have considered whether and how different perceptions of the 
corruption environment directly impact willingness to engage in anticorruption 
activism. As people hold different perceptions of their corruption environment at the 
same time, it is important to also examine whether perceptions interact with each 
other to influence willingness to actively oppose corruption. Here we focus on the two 
variables of interest in the literature, perceptions of corruption levels and government 
effectiveness in controlling corruption. To test what impact an interaction variable 
created between the two has on willingness to engage in anticorruption activism we 
estimated new analyses using the regression models of Table 2 as ‘base models’ and 
added to them an interaction variable of two perception measures.  
Estimating the direction, size and significance of the impact that an interaction 
variable has on a dependent variable in a logistic analysis is not as straightforward as 
it is in a linear regression, like OLS. Because of this statistical inferences cannot be 
made about the impact of an interaction term by simply looking at its co-efficient and 
statistical significance (Ai & Norton, 2003). An insignificant and negative co-
efficient, for example, may hide that the interaction term is significantly and 
positively associated with the dependent variable at high levels of both constituent 
terms, but not at middle or lower levels of the constituent variables. Therefore, it is 
important to ‘unpack’ the effects of the interaction. For this reason, we focus here on 
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the ‘unpacked’ effects of the interaction variable in the logistic regressions, which are 
summarised in Figure 3.  
Through ‘unpacking’ the effects of the interaction we address the question: 
how, if at all, is willingness to get involved impacted by a change in perceived 
government effectiveness, when that change is also accompanied with varying 
perceived levels of corruption? More precisely, Figure 3 displays shifts in the 
predicted probabilities of being willing to engage in anticorruption activism that are 
associated with a change from thinking that the government is very ineffective in its 
efforts to control corruption to thinking that the government is very effective in its 
efforts to control corruption, at different levels of perceived corruption. Denoted by 
black bars is a maximum, highest level of perceived corruption, in grey is a middle 
point, which is a mean level of perceived corruption, and in white is a minimum, 
lowest level of perceived corruption.8  
 
                                                     
8 The minimum, mean and maximum values for non-OECD sample and OECD 
samples are respectively: are-2.61, 0.00, and 2.05, and -3.43, 0.00, and 2.61. 
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Across all of the non-OECD, and two of the OECD logistic regressions 
(reporting and paying more) we find a consistent story. A positive change in 
perceived government effectiveness is associated with a positive shift in the predicted 
probability of being willing to get involved when it is also accompanied by a 
perception that corruption is high. The robustness of this dynamic deserves 
highlighting, as only in the case of ‘number of state contacts’ and gender do other 
variables have such a consistently estimated impact on the dependent variables 
scrutinised in Figure 3. The sizes of the estimated impact of this interaction are quite 
striking as well; in the non-OECD setting, when complemented with a high level of 
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perceived corruption, a minimum to maximum change in perceived government 
effectiveness is predicted to increase the probability of being willing to report 
corruption by 32 percent, join an organisation by 25 percent, protest by 22 percent, 
and pay more for a corruption free product by 18 percent (holding the effects of all 
else equal). Under the same conditions in the OECD (high perceptions of corruption), 
holding all else equal, a minimum to maximum shift in perceived government 
effectiveness is predicted to increase the probability of being willing to pay more for a 
corruption free product by 22 percent and report corruption by a more modest 13 
percent.  
In strong contrast, our estimations indicate that when corruption is perceived 
to exist at a middle level (neither high nor low levels), a shift in perceived government 
effectiveness is not at all associated with changes in the predicted probability of 
willingness to protest or pay more in the non-OECD context, or protest or join an 
organisation in the OECD context. And, in the cases of being willing to report in the 
OECD and non-OECD setting, and join an organisation in the non-OECD setting, at a 
middle level of perceived corruption, the minimum to maximum shift government 
effectiveness is associated with a smaller shift in the predicted probability of willing 
to engage in anticorruption civic action, than that of the comparable predicted 
probability shift associated with a high level of perceived corruption. 
Furthermore, at the lowest levels of perceived corruption, a change in 
perceived government effectiveness is more often than not, not significantly 
associated with a shift in the predicted probability of being willing to get involved. 
Only in the case of protesting in a non-OECD setting is a positive change in perceived 
government effectiveness negatively related to willingness to get involved when 
corruption is perceived to be low.  
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Finally, also examined, in unreported models, is how the interaction between 
the two perceptions associates with the activism indices that were created. To 
summarise those results, for the non-OECD sample, a minimum to maximum change 
in perceived government effectiveness was once again significantly and positively 
associated with the activism index when perceptions of corruption were high (change 
in slope: 0.26, p-value: 0.000), less positively and significantly associated when 
perceptions of corruption were at middle levels (change in slope: 0.08, p-value: 0.005) 
and not significantly associated at low levels of perceived corruption (change in slope: 
-0.12, p-value: 0.075). By contrast, for the OECD sample, the same shift in perceived 
government effectiveness was not significantly associated with the activism index at 
any level of perceived corruption.  
Taken together, the overall message that emerges is both nuanced and clear. 
On the one hand, for those that think that corruption exists only at the margins of 
society, confidence in the government is unlikely to impact their engagement in 
anticorruption work. This is a slightly different finding, compared to the argument 
advanced by Bauhr (2012), which was that perceived government effectiveness would 
negatively impact willingness to engage in anticorruption activity when it was 
accompanied by a view of corruption being incidentally practiced. On the other hand, 
our results also suggest that when corruption is perceived to be a widespread issue, 
particularly in the non-OECD context, a significant growth in confidence in the 
government’s efforts will work to compel willingness to get involved in the fight 
against corruption. This message adds an important layer to the support we found 
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earlier for the argument advanced by Perrson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013).9 Instead 
of perceived widespread corruption only working to dim the activist spirit, our results 
show that it can work with perceived government effectiveness to encourage 
willingness to become engaged. Our findings indicate that willingness to get involved 
hinges not only a perception that the government is working sincerely and effectively 
to tackle corruption, but also on perceiving that corruption is a significant problem to 
tackle.  
 
Conclusion  
The aim of any anticorruption program is to ultimately reduce corruption. The 
logic underscoring demand-side anticorruption interventions holds that the potential 
effects of anticorruption efforts are inherently linked to their ability to motivate broad 
sectors of the population to buy into a mentality that actively opposes corruption. 
Inspired by recent literature, this article has empirically tested whether and to what 
extent different perceptions of the corruption environment impact willingness to fight 
corruption. We found, in a non-OECD setting, that perceptions of corruption being 
widespread can contribute to a ‘corruption fatigue’ whereby people are less willing to 
engage in anticorruption activism, but in an OECD setting such perceptions are likely 
less influential and, if anything, can work to ignite the activist spirit. Though less 
robustly, we also found that perceived government effectiveness and perceptions of 
corruption becoming a worse problem tend to encourage willingness to get involved, 
rather than hamper it. 
                                                     
9 Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) do not address what impact perceived 
government effectiveness may have on corruption patterns or willingness to fight 
corruption. 
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In an additional contribution to the literature, we also examine how these 
perceptions interact with each other to impact willingness to fight corruption. When 
interpreting the effects of an interaction term, we found considerable support for the 
idea that a person’s willingness to actively oppose corruption is a function of how 
different perceptions work when held together. Specifically, we find that especially 
among those who perceive that corruption levels are high, when confidence in the 
government’s efforts grows so will willingness to participate in the fight against 
corruption.  
Taken together and relating this to potential policy lessons, two key messages 
deserve underlining. First, especially in places where corruption is perceived to be 
widely practiced, ‘corruption fatigue’ should be a real concern to those that want to 
encourage a popular anticorruption response; widely held perceptions that corruption 
is normal can work to undermine efforts to get civil society involved in meaningful 
anticorruption work.  
The second message is more hopeful. Especially in a setting where corruption 
is perceived to be widespread, and where society is most vulnerable to ‘corruption 
fatigue’, changing people’s perceptions of their own government’s role in fighting 
corruption can work to counter corruption resignation. Rather than sit on the side lines 
to let the government deal with it, people will likely be encouraged by signs of 
government success to join in on the fight. As such, a strict interpretation of our 
results suggest that, especially in a developing country context, those interested in 
encouraging a civil society anticorruption response should focus awareness raising 
efforts on publicising government successes. However, changing widespread 
perceptions of how effective or sincere the government is in its efforts to tackle 
corruption may admittedly be very difficult. Especially in systemically corrupt 
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contexts, the public may be rightfully sceptical of ‘good governance’ publicity 
campaigns that are not matched by genuine observable changes in how public 
officials deal with corrupt transgressions.  
Thus, perhaps more than anything, our findings highlight the need for further 
research into how perceptions of the corruption environment are formed and 
maintained. We think that a particularly important task going forward will be to assess 
what impact anticorruption awareness raising campaigns have had. Efforts to educate 
citizens about the harms of corruption and what governments are doing to tackle 
corruption are now prominent in many anticorruption campaigns. How if at all are 
these efforts effective in inspiring activism? Or might they be unintentionally 
backfiring, by inducing a sense of ‘corruption fatigue’?   
Though the initial evidence presented here indicates that perceptions of 
corruption matter, it also signals strongly that their effects on activism are non-linear. 
We suspect that no less should be expected of how perceptions interact with various 
anticorruption strategies on the ground. If civic action is key to reducing corruption, 
we must not only pay attention to what people perceive of their corruption 
environment, but how perceptions are shaped, and what role anticorruption 
programming is playing in shaping them. 
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Appendix Table 1: Construction and Sources of Measures 
Variable Q #/Source Notes on construction  Mean Std Dev. Values 
     Dependent Variables     
Report Q10F 1 if willing to report corruption, 0 if not 0.63 0.48 0,1 
Protest Q10B 1 if willing to protest against corruption, 0 if not 0.51 0.50 0,1 
Join Organization Q10C 1 if willing to join anticorruption organisation, 0 if not 0.45 0.50 0,1 
Pay more Q10D 1 if willing to pay more for a corrupt free product, 0 if not 0.48 0.50 0,1 
Activism Index 
(OECD) 
Q10B-D,F 
Factor index created from responses from Q10B-D,F 0.55 0.42 0-1.11 
Activism Index (non-
OECD) 
Q10B-D,F 
Factor index created from responses from Q10B-D,F 0.53 0.42 0-1.09 
     Perceptions      
Corruption level Q6A-C, H-L Factor of perceived corruption of public officials. 0.04 0.89 -2.6-1.6 
Gov’t effective Q5 How effective gov’t: 1 very effective to 5 very ineffective 2.50 1.10 1-5 
Corruption increasing Q1 Past 2 years corruption: 1 decreased a lot, to 5 increased a lot 3.66 1.16 1-5 
     Individual level controls     
# of bribes Q7B1-8  Number of services bribes given 0.53 1.14 0-8 
# of contacts Q7A1-8 Number of services contacted 2.79 2.00 0-8 
Female SEXE 1 female, 0 male  0.50 0.50 0,1 
Age AGE_YRS 1 <25, 2 25-34, 3 35-44, 4 45-54, 5 55-64, 6 65+ 3.07 1.57 1-6 
Income INCOME 1 low, 2 medium low, 3 medium, 4 medium high, 5 high 2.58 1.11 1-5 
Education EDUCATION 1 none, 2 basic, 3 secondary, 4 university 2.96 0.86 1-4 
Urban RURAL 0 rural area, 1 urban area 0.58 0.49 0,1 
     Contextual Controls     
FH democracy Freedom house (2012) Average of civil liberties and political rights score; inversed. 4.11 1.64 1-6 
% women in workforce World Bank  (2011) % of women working in the workforce 51.0 16.3 14.5-88.2 
GDP per capita IMF WEO (2012) 
GDP per capita (ppp), in thousands, current international 
dollars 
13.5 13.6 0.55-54.4 
      Note: Summary statistics reflect the 71-country pooled sample. 
